Analysis of the dynamics of the main political orientations of massive groups of Russian society and the state of contemporary Russian elites suggests the two most probable scenarios of the evolution of the political regime that exist in contemporary Russia.

The first of these involves changing in the balance of power between the various authorities and industrial and corporate groups, the Russian elite towards its consolidation on the basis of the progressive formation and development of civilized market, but with a more effective role for the state. The second scenario is also based on changing the balance of power within the political and economic elites, but a sharp increase of the monopolization of political and economic fields, the strangulation of growing the market and the revival in a new form of comprehensive state monopoly in all major areas of life - particularly the political, economic, informational. In the first case, there are remains scope for further development of political, social and economic modernization of Russian society on the basis of conservation and development, albeit with some restrictions, of democratic institutions. In the second case, very likely become a failure of the modernization on the basis of the development of democratic institutions and the transition process that A. Touraine named contra-modernization; this process, although it does not involve the cessation of modernization itself, sends its first and foremost towards modernizing the army and the military-industrial complex, with dramatic simplification of the political and economic system, the elimination of democratic institutions increase in authoritarian tendencies.

Analysis of representative surveys conducted in recent years by the Public Opinion Foundation and other sociological service, showed that the majority of Russian citizens still support more likely the first one, an evolutionary variant, that involve the preservation and development of democratic institutions while correcting the economic and social policies. According to the survey conducted by Public Opinion Foundation in October 1998, it means after the crisis in August 1998, related to the basic democratic institutions were as follows: Institute for the popular election of the president, deputies, heads of the administration wanted to preserve the full 39% of the respondents, in part to change - 5%, to cancel - just 2%, the freedom of the press wanted to retain the full 51 % of respondents, in part to change - 6%, to cancel - only 2%; wanted to fully preserve the multi-25% of the respondents, in part to change - 10%, just to cancel - 13%.

According to the All-Russian representative survey conducted in late 1996, the Institute of Sociological Analysis, most Russians are not only recognized the importance of many democratic political institutions, but did not agree to their removal, even for the sake of order in the country - the most popular slogan in Russia for all recent years. For example, free elections, to ensure order in the country were willing to donate 6% of all surveyed the citizens of Russia, the freedom of the media - 7%, the right of free entry and exit from the country - 7%, the right of private property, freedom of private enterprise - 11%, freedom rallies, strikes and other mass protests - 12%. However to ensure a multi-order were willing to donate significantly more - 20% of the respondents, because of general weakness, weak political parties and short-term functioning of the multiparty system in contemporary Russia, however, and these accounted for 20% of the relative minority. Despite the fact that such an issue in the last 2-3 years of service, studying public opinion, not asked as can be seen on indirect data, the radical shifts in public opinion on these issues (in spite of the terrorist acts in Russia, military action in Dagestan and Chechnya in 1999-2000.) has not yet happened.

Of course in today’s Russia relations to the order, power, etc. not only not free of the pompous contradiction which get along within same people, but clearly combine of overcrowded, seems as incongruous . A number of these contradictions inherent in the transition state described in the works of G. Diligenskiy and other authors. The strong inconsistency and ambivalence orientations Russians manifested in their relation to power, in which the traditional authoritarian, autocratic attitudes and stereotypes were easy to get on with the more modern. Also indicative the Fund’s survey data, public opinion, in which respondents to express their agreement or disagreement with the following statements about the government: in Russia will be the order and prosperity only when both the authorities and citizens will live under the laws (96% agree 3% disagree), the main idea of the new Russia should be a strict observance of human rights (93% agree, 4% disagree), the power should be strong and strict, this is the only way you can order in Russia (88% agree 9% disagree ), only the strong hand of a strong leader can bring order, to fix cases in the country (83% agree, 13% disagree). It turns out that the vast majority of Russians believe the main priority as human rights, understood that the order in the country can be achieved only by complying with the laws of the authorities and citizens, and yet aspires to a strong arm and strong power that can bring order. The result is a unique combination of hard power in the hands of strict adherence to the same rule of law and human rights - is hardly possible, but nevertheless demanded the mass consciousness. This is quite a real paradox is largely explained by the fact that the majority of Russians, on the one hand, does not want to lose the rights and freedoms gained over the past decade, but on the other - there was a need for a strong state and a strong leader who would order, but without a dictatorship.

Moreover, despite the obvious weariness of many people from those over ten years of reform, their fair (and often unfair) criticism of the mass-media, a large part of the Russian population continues support the policy of reform. According to the All-Russia survey conducted by Public Opinion Foundation in late January 2000, 41% of Russian citizens believed that reform in Russia should continue today. However, 32% of respondents would like to stop the reforms in Russia and another 27% could not answer that shows a relatively small number of superiority advocates of reform. However, such a situation despite some fluctuations, and characterized most of all a ten-year period, when Russia held political and economic reforms. That fact that despite the apparent failure of shock therapy, a low social security, the crisis in August 1998 hit on all segments of the population, and significant part of Russians want to continue the reform, in own way unprecedented in the history of Russia and showed the continued partial support of liberal and democratic reforms. At the same time, relatively small predominance of supporters continued reforms over his opponents clearly pointing to the urgent, vital need for the reforms, much greater social orientation.

Finally, unjustified in the eyes of the majority of Russian citizens also is a move of forcing the development of military-industrial complex, to a worsening of relations with other countries by lowering the standard of living. According to the same public opinion poll Fund (end of January 2000), asked question which of the two goals for Russia in the next 5-10 years is more important for you - to build a normal, stable life or to make the revival of Russia as a great state? 73% of respondents preferred the first goal and only 18% - the second (9% had difficulty with the answer). (It should be clear that, as shown by the previous polls Public Opinion Foundation, respondents often involve a great military power, possessing a strong military power). Despite the worsening of relations with Western countries because of war in the Balkans and the operation in Chechnya, the vast majority of Russians was not ready to sacrifice a normal stable life and it is impossible to do without improving the conditions of existence, even for such a popular goal, as the revival of great state.