The problem of efficiency and dynamism of democratic institutions is very relevant for many countries, including Russia. As we know from the history, democracy has often degenerated into different types of autocracies with previous form, but not on the content of political institutions, which gradually lost its democratic nature and acquired a totally different character. Considering the fact that during the democratic process in 1970 – 1990 a lot of countries in the democratic institutions fostered on the top of existed form, not relying on a strong agreement (pact), the main political forces, the probability that in a crisis situation, these institutions may be ineffective.

It might be a kind of vicious circle: the new democratic political institutions can not be effective enough because they did not provide the necessary support of the mass and elite groups in society, and they can not gain support and legitimacy of these institutions, because in the eyes of most people this system is not effective to help solve problems which faced by the society. It is quite difficult to break this cycle, especially in a time of the weakness of civil society and the inevitable coming after the first period of disappointment euphoria by popular democracy. The constant reference to the inadequacy and lack of democratic political institutions that lead to panic exclamations already faits alleged failure of democracy to dictatorship established, etc., can only further reduce the credibility of democratic or semi-democratic institutions, making them fully ineffective and incompetent. In turn, such an atmosphere in society, created by extreme democrats with their statements that democracy is no longer the case and the extreme authoritarianism with their statements that democracy is not needed, only makes it easier for anti-democratic-minded faction of the ruling elite, a faster and easier emasculation of democratic content of the main political institutions, leading to a gradual transformation of them into something else, resulting in an instrument of authoritarian rule. This applies primarily to the institution of elections in the institution of political parties, parliament, etc.

So the main issue in the transition and in the more crisis situation is not so the purity of principles and a full democracy of major political institutions, but their democracy which coupled with efficiency. The main argument of supporters of authoritarianism has always been the adoption of the principle of inefficiency of democratic institutions, allegedly do not conform to national traditions and characteristics of this state, this civilization, etc. Countered this argument can not just claim that democracy is important and valuable in itself (this point can be received only by part of intellectuals, but not a majority of the population), but the real confirmation of the effectiveness of democratic institutions and the inefficiency of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes.

However, exactly the confirmation of the actual effectiveness of key democratic institutions are the most difficult problem in theory or in practical terms. This applies mainly to Russia, with its small experience of the institutions of democracy, but, of course, not only to it: there is a lot of problems in Latin America, South and South-East Asia, Middle East, including such large states like China, Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran. It should be noted that in the scientific and especially publicist literature effectiveness of democratic institutions is often considered as self-evident, and it does not require proof and justification. Meanwhile, the issue of efficiency and effectiveness of democratic institutions in relation to countries not belonging to the western and other civilizations that seemed to be insufficiently developed. In the context of modernization theory, the modern society and modern political system (which is usually meant as democratic) appears as the most effective, dynamic, adapt to rapidly changing conditions of modern development. But unlike earlier studies of modernization, in more recent work was found that effective modernization could occur only by relying on existing in this society traditions and traditional institutions - otherwise, upgrading will split society and it will increase the social and internal political tensions it means it will lead to the unstable political and economic system. Moreover, traditionality and modernity form two polar unrecoverable outset that in the course of modernization is difficult to interact, interaction and producing each other. However, the key question consists in how to combine with this consistently upgrading the reliance on tradition with the efficiency of democratic political institutions, in the theory of modernization often remains in the shadows. To a large extent, this issue remains outstanding and, in most theories of democratic transit.

Analysis of patterns of development and adoption of democratic regimes suggests that democratic political institutions in a society become truly effective only as a result of a long process of development and adaptation to the conditions and traditions of the society. In this regard, it should be noted that the effectiveness of democratic institutions characteristic of Western countries, contrary established opinion that there does not at once and to achieve it took an extremely long and complex historical process of adaptation of these institutions to the traditions, values and norms of Western society. In fact, if you do not take the United States and to some extent the UK, the real effective democratic institutions in Western countries began only after the Second World War. Even in France, with its long history of attempts at democracy and the effectiveness of the stability of democratic political institutions has been achieved only in late 1960-ies., after the approval of the Fifth Republic and de Gaulle’s government. In countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, it happened even later - in 1970’s - 1980-ies. It would be quite wrong to expect that in Latin America, Southeast Asia, the post-Soviet space, where democratic institutions are established only in 1980’s - 1990-ies., they will immediately become stable and efficient organic blend with the values and norms of these societies.

From this point of view, often heard in the domestic and foreign press allegations of fundamental incompatibility between democracy and democratic institutions, with traditions and norms of the Russian society are at least incorrect. The fact that democratic institutions can only gradually be adapted and efficient, explains all zigzags and turns in the approval and operation of Russia’s political institutions. It would be strange to expect that within ten years in such a huge country like Russia, democracy and democratic institutions will soon become so rooted and are as effective as in developed western countries. Moreover, comparing the state of Russian and Western political systems, the assertion that the major political institutions in Russia are not democracies and have always been denied the democratic content and also very dangerous, because wittingly or unwittingly justify the elimination of these institutions under the pretext of their undemocratic.

Meanwhile, Russian democracy is often judged from the positions of modern countries with developed democracy, implicitly implying that Russia should copy the institutions of those countries and in all guided by their experiences. In this approach, attending to many researchers, publicists and journalists in particular ignores the important fact that the adoption and development of the institution in any society takes place at least three major phases. The first phase is a formation and establishment of the institution, the second phase is legitimization, rooting in the society and the public consciousness, adapted to the traditions and norms, and only the third phase is the growth of its efficiency, a kind of optimization. These phases can intertwine, but they are typically separated in time and in fact, a critical and often the most lengthy is the second phase. Moreover, the second phase of the approval of democratic institutions may be accompanied by (and often it is so) breaks retrogression to authoritarianism, followed by new attempts to approval of democratic institutions in updated form. Such processes are characteristic of democracy, for example, in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece and several other countries. It is possible that similar processes Russia can survive too, where democratic institutions are precisely the second most time-consuming and difficult phase of its development.

From what has been said, of course, it does not mean that the problem of improving the effectiveness of democratic (as, indeed, and market) institutions should not be in today’s Russia. Rather, the problem is most acute, because many new institutions of governance, was not adopted to the conditions and traditions of Russian society, the lack of support for democratic institutions, political elite and mass sectors observed numerous of shortcomings in the functioning of these institutions, and even straight to discredit them. Support from the community is required by a group of political elite only sporadically, as they vie for power and as long as they are forced to appeal to large segments. Once these elite groups have power, attention to the support of the society then sharply decline. The same sporadic-cycling mode of operation and many political institutions, such as the Institute for the elections, political parties and even the Parliament. All this of course affects the effective functioning of political institutions.

It is obvious that what directly relates to the contemporary Russian society and its political system, which developed largely autonomously from social policy to the needs and the needs of large-scale groups. In this regard, some authors have already predict imminent and inevitable liquidation of the democratic political institutions and welcome twist to the very illiberal authoritarianism, dictatorship, the transition from reform. But beyond this impasse, a radical turning, he still did not have enough mass base. Despite the general fatigue not too successful reforms, the majority of Russian citizens, as can be judged according to the mass survey, which will be shown below, do not want volatility of economic and political situation, disruption of political institutions, the isolation of Russia in the international arena. At the same time, the Russian political system as a whole is going through a regular bifurcation, which may be different (though not equally) options for future development and when the trajectory of the political system is not yet fully predetermined.